National spaces and identities— in-corp-oration

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The idea of “homogeneity” in Kyoto (See also: the politics and semantics of homogeneity), and in other places in the world where assimilation to normative cultural behaviors is a part of “incorporation regimes” directed at immigrants (or school children) may be represented as the natural result of a national history. But this representation is merely the first institutional practice that needs to be interrogated.

“...In using the term incorporation regime, I refer to the patterns of policy discourse and organization around which a system of incorporation is constructed. All states develop a set of legal rules, discursive practices, and organizational structures that define the status of foreigners vis-à-vis the host state, and the forms and boundaries of their participation in host polity institutions”
(Soysal 1994, 32).

The problems the Kyoto’s Koreans face when articulating their particular demand for heterogeneity in the face of a homogeneous cultural/national Japanese identity are, at moments, similar to those faced by lesbians/gays who would demand that notions of sexuality open up to a greater diversity of practice and imagination. At some point these demands must also find a social geographic target—a demand that actual (and media) spaces be opened up to these practices. But the practice of articulating such a demand in Kyoto is also made problematic by local constraints on protest in public.

Let’s turn now to look for the discursive and practical contours of public sphere participation in Kyoto and in Japan before we continue the task of locating where Korean residents fit into (or are excluded from) this.

“Priority will be given to basic aspects that are regarded as essential for future citizens, and education will be enhanced to give full scope to individuality. In addition, consistency in the curriculum for each subject area among different school levels, from kindergarten through upper secondary school, should be ensured.”
(Monbusho 1994)
The idea that this (national, paternalist) educational institution should instill “individuality” was first presented in 1985 (after many years of study). Fourteen years later virtually nothing in the curriculum has changed to promote this notion. But “consistency” has always been maintained.

Outside of the schools, the state, at various levels, continues to provide inputs into civic identity through state-run and state-controlled media, from television and radio, to newspapers, pamphlets, and fliers distributed door-to-door. Questions about the influence of the state over “private” media corporations—television networks and newspapers—are beyond the scope of this work¹. Until just recently, the Japanese consumer has not been provided with broadcast media sources of information originating outside of Japan. In part, this is due to Japan’s reliance on the Japanese language, which offers few international inputs, although programming for the Japanese market is now underway in Australia and elsewhere. Foreign language learning in Japan, a multi-billion yen business, is notoriously ineffective in terms of verbal ability (despite six years of required English in public pre-college schools, and more years of college English, Japan ranks low [46th in 1994] in national TOEFL scores).

However, the market for Japanese translations of foreign books is also huge, and works in French or German are often available in Japanese translation in Japan long before they appear in English translation in the United States. The growth of the internet and direct satellite television will give the Japanese consumer sources of information and knowledge outside of the control or “guidance” of Japanese ministries.

¹What is easily noted in this regard is the careful lack of critique concerning the imperial family, and the imperial system, and the fact that foreign governments that object to stories in “private” Japanese newspapers or television find it convenient and effective to complain to the Japanese government.