16 (Bourdieu 1990, 65)
(Bourdieu 1990, 65)
But it is not enough to reject the juridical ideology (what the Anglo-Saxons call the legalism) that comes so naturally to anthropologists, always ready to listen to those dispensers of lessons and rules that informants are when they talk to the ethnologist, that is to someone who knows nothing and to whom they have to talk as if they were talking to a child. In order to construct a model of the game which will not be the mere recording of explicit norms nor a statement of regularities, while synthesizing both norms and regularities, one has to reflect on the different modes of existence of the principles of regulation and regularity of different forms of practice: there is, of course, the habitus, that regulated disposition to generate regulated and regular behaviour outside any reference to rules; and, in societies where the work of codification is not very advanced, the habitus is the principle of most modes of practice.
[Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology. Matthew Adamson, Trans. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ]